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Culture or Commerce: 
On the Liberation of Expression 
Virginia Held 
It is a measure of the triumph of commercialism in the U.S. that few 
Americans can even imagine a culture not subservient to commercial 
interests. This results partly from a failure to recognize that the cul­
rure at present is subservient to commercial interests. But even when 
this reality is understood, no plausible alternative appears possible, so 
chat criticisms of the present structure of cultural production and 
consumption aTe dismissed as utopian, or shunned as dangerous. 
I shall try to show in this paper that our culture ought to be freed 
from commercial domination, and that achieving this liberation is a 
feasible goal. 
Commercialism Triumphant 
Let me first address the question of whether the culture is now domi­
nated by commercial interests. Many Americans believe that it is not. 
They share the view that pervades the society: Americans have a very 
wide choice among cultural offerings; they choose as they wish to 
choose among these offerings, and the culture that results is the out­
come of their preferences. ccConsumer sovereignty" operates to bring 
about a "free culture"; whether we like the culture or not is a separate 
question. Those who don't like it can criticize it, but they should not 
"impose" their values on others. 
The claim that the culture is subservient to commercial interests 
seems to these Americans far,fetched, since the culture is so widely 
thought to be the result of free choices to watch the programs and 
buy the magazines and read the newspapers that people want to watch 
and buy and read. Even if commercial interests gain from the sale of 
cultural products, this is thought of as a relatively incidental by­
product of a performer's popularity or a TV program's wide appeal. 
What gives a producer of a cultural product the capacity to make 
money on that product is that consumers choose to buy it; what leads 
broadcasters to offer one program rather than another is that more 
viewers choose to watch it. So how, this argument holds, can one 
claim that the culture is subservienr to commercial interests? Commer, 
cial interests, in the cultural sphere as in the market, depend on satis, 
fying consumer tastes. 
In dealing with this argument, it may help if we shift our point of 
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view from consumer to producer. What are the chances of producing 
cultural products in contemporary U.S. society for other than com­
mercial gain? The popular image is that anyone can produce anything 
and can try for an audience. If they fail to gain an audience, they have 
nothing to complain about. But this image is highly unsatisfactory. In 
a society in which the mass media characterize the culture, we need to 
speak about the possibilities for the production of mass media pro­
ducts. And then of course it is apparent that the chances for produc­
ing culturally and aesthetically valuable but commercially unpromis­
ing productions are extremely limited. A talented producer might 
apply to a foundation for modest support for the filming of a docu­
mentary which might eventually be shown on a public TV station 
with a wealc signal; already the producer has probably missed the mass 
media audience. Or if one is already a highly successful and very rich 
person, one might take a chance on a new publication designed to 
offer first-rate articles and stories regardless of the commercial gain 
the publication could be expected to achieve. But such possibilities 
are already limited to the already very rich. 
The materials of the mass media are broadcasting studios, air time, 
camera crews, printing presses, etc. They are very e-xpensive. Non­
wealthy but talented persons can express themselves in the materials 
of the mass media only if these materials are available to them. At 
present in the U.S., these materials will only be available to them if 
these persons are willing to subordinate their judgments of what is 
culturally valuable to the commercial aims of those· willing to make 
these materials available. These materials are almost completely 
unavailable to those n·Ot willing to harness their talents to commercial 
goals. 
Consider advertisi ng. Advertising produces more visual images, 
more cultural sounds and sayings, more employment opportunities 
for those who create cultural images and values, than any other area 
of society. Advertising permeates U.S. culture; it is ubiquitous and 
inescapable. Studies show that the typical consumer in the U.S. is 
bombarded by 5 ,000 advertising messages a day, and the number is 
increasing. 1 Advertising is of course cultural production subordinated 
to commercial purpos.es, rather than a source of images and values 
created for their intrinsic cultural and aesthetic worth. 
Many people still think of advertising as providing uinformation," 
as in the conceptual model of the sign announcing the services of the 
village blacksmith. However, the informational content of most con­
temporary advertising is trivial, and what information there is would 
be far better presented by an impartial source. Advertisements are 
hardly even about the objects being sold; rather, they seek to make a 
potential purchaser desire the object so as to feel attractive or success­
ful or envied. As the critic Raymond Williams says of contemporary 
advertising, "the short description of the pattern we have is magic: a 
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highly organized and professional system of inducements and satisfac­
tions, functionally very similar to magical systems in simpler socie­
ries . . .  •;2 People should know from many centuries of experience that 
magic should not be relied on, either as a way of explaining the world 
or as a way of providing cultural meanings and values. Yet its influ­
ence through advertising and the other cultural production it affects 
appears to be swelling. 
Let us look next at the commercialism of television, at its programs 
as well as its advertisements. Television programming has as its pri­
mary goal the building of audiences for commercials. Programs are 
designed for the sake of the advertisements that precede, interrupt, 
and conclude them. This is a fact not even in dispute: though many 
viewers are unaware of the subordination of programming interests to 
advertising interests, both defenders and critics of the U.S. television 
industry agree that, as a Carnegie Commission report put it, cccom­
mercial broadcasting's entire output is defined by an imperative need 
to reach mass audiences in order to sell products. ,,3 Another account. 
by an author approvingly explaining the U.S. system, states that "TV 
programs are packages for commercials,, , and "since the primary aim 
of television is to sell products to a mass market, television must 
design . . .  programs that hold an audience up to and through a commer .. 
cial mes&age. ,,,. The difference for news programs on television is not 
substantial. They are intended also to be, first of all, sufficiently enter­
taining to hold their audiences for the rest of the station's programs 
and hence advertising.5 
Let us note how this commercialization of television came about. 
Herbert Schiller writes: 
Radio and television, almost from their inception in the 
United States were preempted to fulfill the sales objectives 
of the business community. Though cautioned in the 
1920' s by Herbert Hoover not to disfigure the exciting 
potential of the new natural resource that had been discov­
ered, commerce unhesitatingly turned radio into its untir­
ing pitchman. [Then,] against the advice and judgment of 
those who wanted to experiment carefully with the new 
medium and to discover its most fruitful capabilities, tele­
vision prematurely was hurried into the economy by impa­
tient equipment manufacturers and broadcasting networks, 
eager to sell sets and screen time. To no one's surprise, tel­
evision followed closely in radio's commercial footsteps.6 
In the pre-television era, Schiller observes, ccthe United States stood 
alone amongst advanced industrialized nations in having its radio 
broadcasting unabashedly commercial. In no other society did adver­
tisers pay the bill and direct the destinies of the medium so com­
pletely. "7 But by now it is the pattern of commercialism forged in the 
U.S. which threatens to win out elsewhere around the globe. The idea 
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that the enormous communications resource that is television should 
be used to strengthen democracy or promote cultural objectives 
rather than primarily to serve business interests has come to seem 
more and more quixotic to most Americans. Schiller concludes. that 
"it is not only a matter of the ubiquitous, jarring commercial. The 
entire content that illuminates the home screen is fined to the mar­
lceteer's order. "8 As a TV writer he cites lamented in the mid- 1960' s, 
"TV is not an art form or a culture channel; it is an advertising 
medium ... [TV shows) are not supposed to be any good. They are sup­
posed to make money ... 'quality' may be not merely irrelevant but a 
distraction. "9 What has happened since is that any large-scale alterna­
tive seems more and more unimaginable. 
What about audiences? If large numbers of people watch these 
shows, does this not indicate that they like them? Isn't commercial 
television giving the public what it wants? Such a view ignores the 
contest in which popularity with an audience at a given time is taken 
to be a test of cultural appeal. Audiences in the U.S. have been 
exposed since early childhood to an average of four to seven hours a 
day of almost completely commercial television.10 They have been 
surrounded since infancy by an almost completely commercialized 
culture. A commercialized culture seems so natural and inevitable in 
the U.S. that any alternative seems immediately odd, marginal, and 
suspect. To find out what audiences "really" prefer, we would need to 
have for an extended period non-commercial production using ithe 
materials of the mass media at levels of technical competence and of 
expenditure comparable to that of commercial prod.uction. Instead of 
impoverished public stations constantly begging for funds and able to 
mount only the most modest programs, we would n.eed to have non­
commercial producers with resources like those of the commercial 
networks at their disposal. And viewers would have to have been 
brought up with a variety of such noncommercial alternatives as read­
ily available as the commercial ones. 
Many people suppose that newspapers and magazines are somewhat 
different from television, that journalistic aims are sometimes fore­
most and the desire to be commercially successful secondary. Increas­
ingly, any differences there may have been are for most publications 
narrowing. Newspapers are very profitable businesses; they are 
increasingly owned and directed by small numbers of huge corpora­
tions. Ben Bagdikian writes: 
It was in the 1965-1980 period that American mass media, 
especially newspapers, came under maximum control of 
national and multinational corporations ... Corporate 
ownership changed the form and content, the strategies of 
operation, and the economics of newspapers. 
Newspapers and other media bought by large corpora­
tions as investments come under new pressures for maxi-
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mizing profits . . .  In addition, the new corporate ownership 
hastened the conversion of newspapers to primarily carri­
ers of advertising. Advertisers want affluent readers . . .  
Newspapers control their readership by not reporting sig­
nificantly on neighborhoods of low-income and elderly 
populations and by promoting their circulation in affluent 
neighborhoods . . . 1 1  
A former president of the American Society of Newspaper Editors 
who has headed four major newspapers says of the business today 
that "the profit response to the First Amendment is often much 
stronger than the journalistic response," in the print as well as in the 
electronic media. "The underlying purpose," he writes, "is to create 
an uncritical., permissive buying mood for the benefit of advertisers . . .  
The main go.al of the news media conglomerates must be mass 
advertising. "12 
In sum, it seems clear that all the various forms of mass media in 
the U.S. are subordinated to commercial interests. Within these con­
straints, excellent TV programs are occasionally produced, some 
excellent magazine articles do get published, and some excellent 
reporting does appear in newspapers. But these achievements are 
reached despite nearly overwhelming commercial domination, not 
because of it. How could it be denied that with expanded opportuni­
ties for �ultural expression free of the need to satisfy commercial 
interests, the talent that obviously exists in U.S. cultural life could 
flourish admirably, rather than merely shine through the barriers 
from time to time? 
To see how questionable is the ordering of values that puts com­
merce over culture, consider what it would be like to have education 
analogously dependent on commercial interests and market outcomes. 
Some education resembling that available at present in private prep 
schools and a few private colleges might remain available for the 
children of the wealthy. A few religious schools might survive. And 
various types of training would be offered by corporations in whose 
interest it would be to have employees trained in that way. But the 
overwhelming bulk of education, elementary, secondary, and higher, 
would simply disappear. Commercial interests cannot create an edu­
cated public; only publicly funded public education can do so. Sim­
ilarly, commercial interests cannot create a satisfactory culture, yet 
culture at present is almost entirely left to the mercies of commerce. 
AltematitleS to Commercialism 
The degree of commerdalism in the production of culture in the U.S. 
is sometimes so blatant that some Americans are led to wonder if 
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commercial interests should be regulated, modified. or otherwise 
muted. They may argue that children's programs that are no mort> 
than program-length dramatized advertisements for toy manufactur­
ers' products are offensive. Or they may think the numbers of min­
utes of commercials per hour of programming should be reduced. Or 
they may ask for truth-in-advertising regulations to soften the most 
obvious and deceitful untruths. But these are minor limitations on an 
overwhelming domination of culture by business. Alternatives to the 
latter are almost never discussed or even imagined except among small 
and marginal groups. 
One reason is that the only alternative to business domination that 
most Americans have heard of is state domination. Culture produced 
for purposes of political propaganda, through state control of the 
media and state censorship of free expression, is an alternative made 
familiar and entirely unacceptable by frequent commentary and repor­
tage on the Soviet Union, the Communist bloc countries of Eastern 
Europe, China, and various other countries. As between state domi­
nation and commercial domination, almost everyone prefers the latter 
even when they recognize it as domination. Part of the triumph. of 
commercialism in the media is that it has created the widespread 
belief that the only alternative to commercial control is state control, 
and almost no one favors that. 
Over and over, the pattern of popular discussion of the media in 
the U.S. has been to focus on relatively minor aspects of commercial­
ism, and to fail to question commercialism itself. Thus there have 
been periods of concern about a lack of competition among media 
giants, and occasional proposals for curbing monopoly and encourag­
ing marketplace diversity among media producers. 1 3  That the compe­
tition should not always be between commercial interests is not dis­
cussed. The Federal Communications Commission is charged by law 
to regulate broadcasting "in the public interest," but this has been 
interpreted as a permission to regulate the media to serve the eco­
nomic interests of the industry as a whole. Oliver Wendell Holmes' 
metaphor of a "marketplace of ideas" as that for which we should 
strive has monopolized thinking about the media. 1 4  Unfortunately, 
that one of ideas in that marketplace should be to take culture out of 
it almost never arises in public discussions of the media in the U.S. 
How unsatisfactory it is to be limited in discussing the media to the 
alternatives of state control or commercial control can be seen if we 
draw, again, an analogy between culture and education. In the case of 
education, we know o( systems where the heavy hand of the state con­
trols the education of children and the appointments of professors, 
and of course we deplore this. And we can imagine a commercial 
alternative, where education would be available only to those able to 
pay for it in an educational free market, and professors would be 
appointed ,on the basis of their commercial appeal and service to cor-
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pcrare inrerests. Alrhough education in rhe U.S. is nor as unlike rhis 
as. it should be, we ar least aspire ro achieve independence and aca­
demic freedom. In rhe case of education we know thar srare controE or 
commercial control are nor rhe only alrernarives, and rhar rhe goal of 
a sarisfacrory sysrem of educarion. especially of higher education. 
must be to be free from domination by either the state or the market­
place or both. We could strive for similar possibilities for cultural 
expression and enjoyment. 
A Free Culture 
What is culture? Anth ropologists used to apply the word "culture" to 
almost everything that occurred in the societies they studied, but 
more recently some agreement is emerging among those writing about 
culture that culture is to be distinguished from social structure. Cul­
ture is what gives meaning to what occurs. It consists of the symbols 
and meanings created by humans in societies. It is not the same as the 
systems of authority and institutions which allocate power and organ­
ize economic activity and constitute the social structure. Culture can 
include the "high culture" of art in museums and of literature read 
only by the highly educated, as well as the "popular culture" of televi­
sion, radio and mass magazines. Some argue that the lines between 
high culture and popular culture are increasingly blurred, but this is a 
separate ·issue from that of commercialism vs. non-commercialism, 
though the two may be causally connected. 
I shall discuss cultural freedom in a context such as that of the Uni­
ted States at present, where the mass media are a salient aspect of the 
culture. The appropriate role of culture, and therefore of the mass 
media, is as legitimate a question for social philosophy as is the 
appropriate role of government. It is unfortunate that philosophers 
have paid relatively little attention to this question. Wil(h the devel­
opment of the mass media and the obviously great influence of the 
media in shaping society, it seems important for philosophers to deal 
seriously and in a sustained way with questions about what the aims 
and practices of culture ought to be. 
Perhaps the following general principles could be agreed to by most 
philosophers: Culture ought to attempt to make sense of human expe­
rience, to provide an understanding of the choices possible for 
humans in given societies, and to promote the flourishing of human 
expression. Some would hold that culture ought itself to contribute to 
sustaining or improving moral life, others that this is not specifically 
the task of culture. In any case, culture needs to provide evaluations 
and critiques of and proposals for improving a society's existing social 
structure; it should not merely reflect or reinforce the configurations 
of power already in place. 
If we accept such a view of the goals of culture, we can argue that a 
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culture dominated by commercial interests fails to contribute as it 
should to achieving these goals. A culture free to do so would have to 
be a cultur� that is not beholden to economic interests as well as not 
subject to political control. Obviously, the United States at present 
does not have a free culture in this sense, since the overwhelming pre­
ponderance of its cultural production is designed to serve the interests 
of economic gain. ln the U.S. today, culture is commerce. 
A culture which is not yet free could strive, and have others strive 
on its behalf, for independence from outside control, either political 
or commercial. It could have as its goal to be a culture which would 
offer genui ne possibilities for free expression for everyone. There is 
no reason to dismiss such a goal as utopian or dangerous. Culture 
could strive for protection from outside interference by adopting an 
analogue of the principle of academic freedom, a principle which ena­
bles universities in the U.S. to strive to foster independent thought 
and inquiry. Universities can aim to be open to all on the basis of 
ability and achievement, rather than wealth. Universities do not have 
commercial gain as a priority, and not only because, as commerce, 
they would not be very successful; some might be economically suc­
cessful if they openly sold their independence to corporate interests. 
Corporations spend large sums on research, training, the collection 
and transmission of information. But universities strive for a different 
kind of research and for education that does not subordinate itself to 
commercial objectives. At the same time, most universities depend 
largely or a great deal on public funding, but they resist, with consid­
erable success, political control. 
Some critics of U.S. society believe that educational institutions in 
the U.S., including those of higher education, are highly subservient 
to capitalis,tic economic structures, but my argument rests only on 
comparative judgments. It is clear that universities are more inde­
pendent of outside control than are the mass media, and that they 
provide greater opportunity for free thought and non-commercial 
production . Independence from both state and commercial control is 
at least an aspiration if not a reality in higher education; it is not even 
an aspiration in the media, but it could be. 
One can imagine efforts in the production of culture, on a much 
wider scale than any able to subsist at present, aiming at and eventu­
ally having comparable independence. For instance, there could be 
newspapers whose goals really would be to inform and enlighten the 
public rather than to boost profitability, and there could be television 
networks that would seek to provide the best entertainment of the 
highest quality for mass audiences, as well as expanded programs for 
specialized audiences, all for distinctively cultural rather than com­
mercial values. 
9
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Everyone requires social support. The myth of an inde�ndent 
RobinsonCrusoe-like individual ignores the reality of what others­
including those who care for children - provide. Whatever society 
does not take from us in the way of life, liberty, and estate, it accords 
us. And whatever we "earn" in the "marketplace" we only earn 
because society makes this possible. 
Society can enable some persons to gain part or all of their income 
by producing culture. It could make the possibilities for cultural 
independence and free expression much more widely available than 
they are at present. But responsibilities would accompany and often 
precede opportunities. 
We all have social responsibilities, but those engaged in the produc­
tion of culture have special responsibilities to achieve the aims of cul­
ture previously outlined. They ought to put independence of judg­
ment and intellect, independence from control by established power, 
both economic and political, ahead of othe,r considerations. They 
ought to put moral and aesthetic considerations ahead of the interests 
of corporations or states. The primary responsibilities of those who 
are enabled by the society to produce its culture should be to articu­
late and to represent the images, norms, goals, values, and standards 
by which the society ought to be guided. Anyone engaged in the pro­
duction of culture should be an activist for intellectual independence 
and for enlarged possibilities for free expression. t s  
Of course free expression requires an absence of censorship, as tra­
ditionally acknowledged. But an absence of censorship is by no means 
sufficient for free expression. Free expression requires also the eco­
nomic and cultural means to express oneself freely. And in a culture 
where expression is dominated by the mass media, access to expres­
sion in and through the media should not depend on already possess­
ing the economic resources to buy such means of expression. To par­
ticipate in pursuing the appropriate goals of culture, persons should 
be enabled to participate in cultural expression as they should be 
enabled to obtain education. The capacity to participate should in 
neither case be limited to those who have wealth or can successfully 
please those who control corporate wealth in or out of the media. The 
standards for participation in the production of mass culture should 
be independent of economic resources and uses, as the standards for 
the acquisition of education and participation in the progress of 
knowledge should be. Of course not everyone can go to Harvard or 
appear on CBS, but access to both should depend on talent and 
achievement impartially assessed. And if private institutions are 
unable or unwilling to be impartial, there should be public institu­
tions that can and will be. 
The United States at present by no means assures adequate enabling 10
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rights to education. The children of rich parents are twelve rimes as 
likely to get college degrees as the children of poor parents even when 
the two groups are of equal intelligence, 16 and this is a shocking indi­
cation of the lack of equality of opporruniry that exists in education. 
Professional education is even less open to those with economic dis­
advantages. Nevertheless, the concept of a right to education as an 
enabling right is clear enough. Almost everyone agrees that education 
ought to be open on the basis of merit not money, and that a right to 
education must be a r:ight to have access to education, not merely a 
right to buy an expensive education if one already has the economic 
resources. We understand, conceptually, what a right to education 
ought to include and what ought to be done to assure respect for such 
rights. 
We have no comparable conceptions of enabling rights to cultural 
expression, but to deal with questions about what culture ought to 
provide and how persons should act to achieve this. we ought to 
develop them.17 
Feasible Change 
A concrete step that could be taken to increase cultural freedom 
would be vastly increased public funding of public broadcasting and 
of cultural production of many kinds. The forms of cultural produc­
tion that would thus be encouraged should be different for different 
audiences. They should range from the most popular and least intel­
lectually demanding entertainment to the most developed forms of 
high art and specialized creativity. But all such forms should be 
enabled to be guided by cultural and aesthetic standards and goals, 
not the standards and goals of economic gain and commercial success. 
There has recently been some discussion over whether public tele­
vision should offer programming for small, specialized audiences, or 
whether it should strive to reach mass audiences.18 This debate iis as 
tragic as other debates that see slightly different forms of commercial­
ism as the only alternatives for the bulk of media production. Why 
should there not be both kinds of public television? Why shouldn't 
public television be supported at a level that would enable it to offer 
many kinds of programming? Why should there not be in every 
community several public channels for different types of audiences, 
all of them non-commercial? 
In the 19th century we developed a massive scheme of public edu­
cation so that education would no longer be completely dependent on 
the possession of private wealth. Gradually, access to even higher 
education has been opened to more persons and has become less a 
privilege of the rich. Private schools and colleges were not replaced, 
but a wide range of alternatives were developed . A comparable devel­
opment of large-scale publicly supported possibilities for cultural 
11
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expression would enable us to progress toward having a free culture. 
As academic freedom protects relatively well the independence of 
chose supported by universities, so a comparable standard of freedom 
from outside control could be demanded of those who work in other 
areas of cultural expression.19 And there could be institutional arran­
gements supporting cultural independence so that the preconditions 
for such independence are not limited to those who happen to have 
chem from such accidental and unrelated occurrences as that their 
parents left them a fortune or they have amassed a large amount of 
wealth from trading in securities or conducting a real-estate business. 
In an advanced society, all persons should be enabled to express 
themselves in their spare time. But those whom society enables to 
earn a living in cultural production have special responsibilities to 
promote the independence of culture and to try to bring it about that 
a given work contributes to what a culture ought to do. 
Problems ConfTonted 
Alasdair Macintyre has said that my position requires me to suppose 
that the producers of culture can be "purely external critics," that 
they can devise and justify conclusions concerning genuine moral 
worth independently of any appeal to de facto beliefs, conventions, 
and institutions.20 I do not think my suggestions require this. We can 
look at historical examples of the kind of relative independence I am 
advocating, as science has liberated itself from religious control, and 
as art struggles often for freedom from political control. 
I am not imagining that those who shape culture can be fully inde­
pendent, especially of the beliefs of their times. But they can be more 
inde·pendent, or less independent, of the power that is dominant at 
any given time in a given society. And greater independence from 
existing configurations of power is conducive to improved beliefs and 
more satisfactory cultural expression. I am advocating more inde­
pendence for cultural expression than most of those engaged in such 
expression in our society now have or even aspire to. And I am argu­
ing for such independence for more persons. 
I am sometimes accused of being ahistorical. However, my discus­
sion here is focused on a given time and place: the United States at 
the present time. And I offer the kind of comparative judgments my 
non-ahistorical colleagues often recommend concerning other beliefs 
and attitudes. I make comparisons between the production of culture 
and of knowledge in our society, and I suggest improvements in the 
former so that in terms of independence from outside control it more 
near ly resembles the latter. Clearly, we can compare the intellectual 
independence that people protected by academic freedom can exercise 
with the much more limited intellectual independence of most others 
who shape the culture in our society. And surely we can recommend 
12
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concrete steps to help liberate the culture from the grip of commercial 
control. 
It is important not to exaggerate the degree of independence of uni­
versities in American society, and not to minimize the damaging 
aspects of elitism and professionalism. I am only asserting that univer­
sities offer relatively larger pockets of independence from what some 
critics think of as the cultural hegemony of capitalism than do the 
mass media as now constituted. To enable those working in th,e media 
and producing media culture to catch up to the degree of independ­
ence possible for those in academic life would be progress. 
In my recent book Rights and Goods I argue for different moral 
approaches for different social contexts, that is, for a division of 
moral labor. I think we can show that different social roles ought to 
be guided by different moral considerations, and the book attempts to 
specify some norms and values appropriate for various social roles. 
Sometimes the producers of culture ought to support and streng­
then existing standards against tendencies toward disregard of them 
and toward the weakening of their requirements. But given the dan­
gerous irrationality, the injustice and cruelty, of existing societies, the 
producers of culture ought especially to demand improvements soon 
in their stTuctures, The dearest distinction that needs to be main­
tained is that between power, including economic power, and aes­
thetic and moral value, and we ought to decide what has aesthetic and 
moral value from positions as independent as possible from such 
power. 
Ultimately, if we could get outside history, there might be no need 
for role moralities. We could perhaps then have one total scheme of 
recommendations showing how everything should fit together. But we 
cannot transcend history, and from where we are here and now, we 
do better, in my view, to develop different norms for different roles. 
A unified moral field theory for anything anyone should do anywhere 
is a postponable goal. In the meantime, those who produce culture 
have an obligation, I think, to do what Macintyre suggests is possible: 
to show the incoherences and failures of previous theory, to hasten 
the development and acceptance of the ubest theory to emerge so 
far." But theories do not simply ((emerge" all by themselves, and 
these arguments are valid for other concerns than those of "theory." 
Persons create cultural images and influences concerning what has 
value and what does not, and other persons accept or resist them. I 
am suggesting that persons will do better to do so from positions that 
are independent from existing structures of power, including eco� 
nomic power, rather than from positions beholden to them. 
The society now expends vast amounts of its resources on the 
images and programs and cultural productions that are advantageous 
to commercial interests. It is a very rich though subservient culture. 
The society could redirect some of the sums it spends on commercial 
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culrure toward the production of cultural expression free of commer­
cial domination. This would allow for the development of a much 
more satisfactory array of choices for the consumers of culture than is 
now available. where the choices are virtually all between commercial 
products. 
The airwaves of the U.S. have been given away for commercial 
development. The society could regain them. or some of them. for use 
in the interest of public benefit and enjoyment rather than of corpo­
rate profit. It could at least tax the enormous profits of broadcasters 
co raise money for public programming. And it could end its tax sub­
sidies for advertising and for corporate cultural expenditures, direct­
ing such sums instead toward independent cultural production and 
consumption. 
Macintyre relies heavily on "our traditions," and our "shared 
beliefs.' '1 1  I find in our traditions, including the "rational" traditions 
invoked by Macintyre. highly conflicting tendencies and many aspects 
whkh ought ro be rejected. If we put aside the visual metaphors 
deemed to be distorting. zz we can still recognize in our traditions: war. 
exploitation, racism, patriarchy. These are not traditions to which we 
should be loyal, and there is no escape from the responsibility of 
deciding which of the beliefs and practices of the society in which we 
find ourselves we ought to share, and which we ought to try to 
change. Cultural consideration of alternative images and values is an 
essential part of the process. 23 And a culture liberated from commer­
cia� control as well as from religious and political control could con­
tribute greatly. A society permeated by the media, which some are 
beginning to call a "media society, "24 could then, perhaps, in turn be 
transformed by a liberated culture. 
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